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V 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to respond to the evidence marshalled showing that by the 
clear weight of evidence presented at trial, the trial court erred quieting title to the disputed property 
in the Gillmors. The evidence marshalled in the Appellant's brief, clearly demonstrates that title 
should not be quieted in Gillmor but rather that the interpretation of the original deeds from the 
common grantor are correct and that the boundary goes to the road and that therefore the title should 
be quieted in Cummings. The evidence as marshalled in the Appellant's brief shows that Cummings 
relied in good faith upon the deed and the understanding that he gained from Emil Marcellin, the 
grantor to Cummings, in deciding where the property line was to his newly acquired property. 
Based upon the deed and the understanding Cummings received from Emil Marcellin, Cummings 
instructed the surveyor to survey the property descriptive in the deed. Cummings' understanding as 
to the boundary line location was supported by testimony from Al Pelton (R. 002041). Cummings' 
testimony, which was undisputed, was that he gave a deed or tax notice containing the legal 
description to the surveyor, Mr. Neeley, from which he was to survey the property. Cummings went 
to the property with the surveyor. Cummings told the surveyor what Emil Marcellin had told 
Cummings. This testimony was undisputed and conclusively demonstrates no malice or action in 
bad faith. Cummings' interpretation of the deed description was consistent with the interpretation 
of it by licensed surveyor Kent Wilde and the interpretation given it by David Moore, who was 
qualified as a land title expert. For this separate reason the court also, as a matter of law, should 
hold that no malice was involved and therefore no damages (attorney's fees) should be awarded, 
malice being a threshold requirement which must be met in order to award damages (attorneys fees). 
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If the experts cannot agree and there is no patent mistake in either experts' opinion, it would be a 
serious policy error for the court to award attorney's fees under these circumstances. Attorney's fees 
would have to be awarded in every boundary dispute case. To so rule would eliminate the malice 
requirement and change Utah law on that subject. The public policy of this state does not favor an 
award of attorney's fees absent a statute or contractual term providing for these payments. 
The testimony at the trial supports the position that the road never moved and that it lies in 
essentially the same position now, as it did when the common deed grantors, Spencers, deeded the 
property to Gillmor and Cummings' predessors. The Plaintiffs/Appellees have failed to respond to 
the evidence marshalled. Frank Gillmor simply relied upon Frank Marcellin's testimony that the 
road had moved and the testimony of Gillmor's surveyor, James West. Mr. West acknowledged 
that he surveyed from a partition decree which was not in the chain of title. Therefore, his testimony 
should be disregarded. The quarter corner used by Mr. West in his survey had been obliterated and 
was reset, and therefore did not provide a reliable monument from which Mr. West could base his 
survey. 
Gillmors relied upon a statement from Frank Marcellin that the road moved in the early 
1930's. Frank Marcellin was born in 1931, and would have had to formulate this observation and 
opinion by the time he was four years old. No other evidence was present at the trial which showed 
that the road had moved.. The Appellant had three witnesses of the appropriate age in the 1930's, 
who testified that the road had never moved. Gillmors tried to use a statement by Blaine Bittner to 
support the proposition that the road had moved. Mr. Bittner actually testified (R. 002077) that he 
would be surprised to hear that Frank Marcellin testified the road had moved, but that he would not 
refute Mr. Marcellin because he lived on the property. This is the sum total of the 
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Plaintiffs/Appellees' supportive evidence that the road had been moved. 
The Plaintiffs/Appellees attempt to show that the evidence presented at the trial demonstrated 
that Cummings' actions in surveying, subdividing and selling the property were done recklessly and 
maliciously. These alleged facts are not supported by competent evidence from the record. 
The Gillmors stated in their brief that Cummings never gave Neeley, the surveyor, a deed 
or description, but merely showed him the property and instructed Neeley where to survey. The 
record shows this to be a misstatement. The testimony by Cummings (R. 001500) states that he 
clearly remembers giving Neeley either a copy of the deed or the tax notice which contained the 
description. Neeley 's testimony was that the file didn't contain a copy of the deed and he thought 
that is why they called it a Post Survey; but he had no actual recollection as to whether or not 
Cummings had given him a written description. Therefore, Cummings' testimony is undisputed 
except for the vague inference that because Neeley's file did not contain a written legal description 
twenty years later, it must, therefore, have been why they designated it a Post Survey. 
The trial court erred when it did not allow a set off of the amount paid by the other 
defendants in the suit in settlement, as the value of the disputed area was approximately 24% of the 
amount the Gillmors received from the other defendants' settlement. The remaining 76% should 
have been credited toward attorney's fees. To do otherwise, causes an inequity or unjust enrichment 
on the part of the Gillmors. 
The Plaintiffs/Appellees failed to respond to marshalling argument in connection with the 
issue of Boundary by Acquiescence. There was clear evidence, which was undisputed, that for 
over twenty years, a fence existed along the road. Cummings, or his successors in interest occupied 
up to the road. Neither Gillmors nor their predessors challenged the occupancy. 
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Cummings marshalled the evidence demonstrating that Gillmors slandered title to the 
property owned by Cummings by making false statements as to the ownership, recording survey 
maps, decrees, and lis pendens for property that clearly, by any of the deed description, belonged 
to Cummings. Cummings lost a sale on the property due to the claim of interest the Gillmors made 
for the property. The Gillmors acted in a reckless and malicious manner in failing to have the 
original deed and the partition decree description examined when they had the survey prepared, and 
their failure to read the partition decree that clearly failed to include a natural monument which 
caused an assumption to be made in surveying that gave rise to the Gillmors making a claim for the 
property for which they clearly had no title. 
The court erred in awarding attorney's fees. The evidence totally failed to show that 
Cummings acted in a malicious or reckless manner in subdividing or deeding the property. No 
damage (attorney's fees) award is appropriate when there is an absence of malice. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES FAILED TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S MARSHALLING OF 
THE EVIDENCE ARGUMENT AND THEREFORE 
THE COURT DECISION MUST BE REVERSED 
ON THE ISSUE OF QUIET TITLE 
The Plaintiffs/ Appellants failed to respond to Defendant/Appellant's marshalling of the 
evidence, and, therefore, the court decision must be to reversed on the issue of Quiet Title. Many 
facts come into play when trying to demonstrate that the title to the undisputed property rightfully 
belongs in Cummings, (1) being what was the original drafters of the deeds intent, (2) what was 
actual physical appearance of the property, and (3) what were the representations made at the time 
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of the sale of property to Cummings by Emil Marcellin. 
Both Al Pelton and Cummings testified (R. 002041 and R. 001521) that Marcellin told them 
that the property boundary was the property that laid west of the road. It is clear from all of the 
testimony given by Frank Marcellin (R. 001978), that the road has not moved since Pelton and 
Cummings acquired the property. Cummings relied on the representation along with the legal 
description referring to the road as the division of the property when he had the property subdivided. 
These facts are undisputed. 
Gillmors showed that there is a discrepancy in the distance between the West Quarter Corner 
and the road of more than 242 feet in the disputed area. The testimony given at trial showed that 
this was not only footage discrepancy, but another discrepancy in distance existed between the 
road and a point, on the south part of the property description. In this instance, the call was to a 
point which was to be 5 rods of 82.5 feet from the prior call but in actuality is over 300 feet (R. 
001765). There was obviously some bad measurements in the deeds. Which measurement should 
be looked at to determine where the boundary is located? The courts, along with the principle of 
surveying, set forth that when a distance discrepancy exists between two monuments, the distance 
yields in favor of what the actual distance is between two monuments. In Octor v. Maw, 493 P. 2d 
989 (S.Ct. Utah 1972), the court adhered to the principle that a distance call yields to the monument 
call citing that the reason being that there is more likelihood of a mistake in courses and distances 
than between fixed objects. Gillmor chose to overlook one distance, which is not correct, yet using 
the same fact that there is a discrepancy in a distance call, chose to proceed and make claim for 
property. 
Gillmors cite Williams v. Oldrovd. 581 P.2d 561,(Utah 1978), which supports the theory 
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that in the event of an ambiguity a monument takes precedence over a call of a course or distance. 
This theory we concur with. Gillmors goes on to state that there is no ambiguity which exits so, 
therefore, this rule does not apply. If no ambiguity exits then why does Gillmors chose to use this 
theory on the south part of the property description where an advantage exists when a call asks for 
a distance of 82.5 feet to go to a point on the easterly side of the aforesaid six rod wide road. The 
actual distance is over 300 feet. Yet Gillmors, again, on the north part of the description in the area 
of the dispute, chose not to apply the same principle stating that there is no ambiguity in this area 
of the deed even though there is a 240 foot discrepancy in the deed description, they chose at this 
point in the deed to apply the theory. The logic in this area seems to be to apply the theory when the 
advantage is to Gillmors. 
Two highly skilled surveyors, James West for the Gillmors (R. 001371), and Kent Wide for 
Cummings (R. 001765), together with the co-oberating of Mr. Wilde's interpretation by David 
Moore, a qualified land title expert (R. 001687), testified what was in their expert opinion the 
boundary between where the properties lie. Neither surveyor could agree. Both surveyors used good 
surveying techniques. The only difference was, James West ignores the road, uses the Quarter 
Corner, a monument reset after Cummings had purchased the property, the distance between 
between the point and the Quarter Corner as absolute to the 5 rods. Kent Wide used the method that 
when there is a discrepancy between a distance and the monuments, it is customary to yield to the 
monument, especially in the light that the Quarter Corner had been reset (R. 001765). If the experts 
can't agree on where the boundary is located, then how can malice exist in view of these facts. 
An important point always left out of consideration is Gillmors' contention that the call 
which they contend calls for a departure from the road, as in Mr. West's version (R. 002017) is as 
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follows: 
Northerly and Westerly to a point 3 rods East 
from the Southwest corner to the Northwest Quarter 
of Section 28, aforesaid; 
One of the key words that is overlooked is the word aforesaid. Upon examination of the deed, it 
appears that the authors of the deed use the word aforesaid to refer to the "six wide rod road". 
Therefore, the call does reference the road and would lend more weight to the theory as set forth by 
Mr. Wide (R. 001765). 
Another question raised by Gillmors during the trial was that there is no six rod wide road 
in the area either now nor at the point of time when the deeds were drafted. Blaine Bittner 
(R.002072) answers at least part of that question when he states that in 1925, one year before the 
authoring of the first deed from Spencers, road grading work had began in this area. It is evident 
that the intent for a six rod wide road was there in 1926, and the clear intent of the author of the 
original deed was to use the road as part of the boundary line between the two parcels of land. 
Another key issue is whether a road was moved in the early 1930fs or not. The only person 
who testified of the road moving was Frank Marcellin. Frank Marcellin stated (R. 001971) that he 
knew the W.P.A. crews in the early 1930fs maybe as early as 1932, but not any earlier. When asked 
why he knew the the crew had not been working prior to 1932, Marcellin answered, ffI don't 
believe so because my mother and dad would have surely told me if they had of (R. 001971). It 
should be reemphasized that Marcellin was born in late 1931 (R. 001971) and would have had to 
formulate this observation and opinion by the time he was four years old. This statement was made 
in the face of another witness, Blaine Bittner, who stated that when he was nine or ten (1925) 
grader work had began on the road (R. 002072). Three witnesses of the appropriate age and 
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knowledge of the area testified that the road never moved. Gillmors contend that a number of 
witnesses supported Frank MarceUin's statement of the road moving. Gillmor uses Blaine Bitter's 
testimony when he was asked if he would be surprised to learn that Frank Marcellin had testified 
the road had moved, to demonstrate Bittner supported in MarceUin's statement, quoted below is an 
except from the Appellees' brief as how tht quoted Bittner statment: 
"I can't refute him because he lived there." 
Gillmors failed to state the whole statement. The question put to Mr. Bittner was: 
"Would it surprise you if I were to tell you that Frank 
Marcellin recalls watching them make changes the 
road about their place?" 
Bittner answer was (R. 002072): 
"Yeah. I can't refute him because he lived there." 
Bittner testified he would be surprised to leam of MarceUin's statement, but in difference would not 
refute the statement. Not refuting the statement does not lend credence to the point that he agreed 
or supported MarceUin's view. An important note is the age difference between these two parties. 
At the time of the so called road change, Mr. Bittner who grew up on a ranch located north of the 
disputed property on the same road, was 16 years old at the time the road changes were taking place, 
and Frank Marcellin, who of course lived on the property was only a year or two old when this 
questionable road change began. 
The court may ask what property is left to be quieted if the other Defendants have purchased 
the property in the settlement as Gillmors contend. The only remaining piece which the Gillmors 
seek to have Quiet Title is the 5200 North road entrance to the subdivision, a road used for over 
twenty years to gain access to the subdivision. 
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The court after review of the briefs submitted and in view of the failure of the 
Plaintiffs/Appellees respond to the evidence marshalled, the court decision must be reversed on the 
issue of Quiet Title. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES FAILED TO RESPOND TO 
DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S MARSHALLING OF THE 
EVIDENCE ARGUMENT AND THEREFORE THE 
COURT'S DECISION MUST BE REVERSED ON THE 
ISSUE OF SLANDER OF TITLE 
A. THE EVIDENCE MARSHALLED SHOWED THAT 
CUMMINGS DID NOT ACT WITH MALICE 
The facts that were marshalled in the briefs showed that Cummings' actions were reasonable 
and were without malice. Cummings and Al Pelton purchased the property in 1960 from Emil 
Marcellin. At the time of the purchase both men had toured the property with Emil Marcellin. Emil 
Marcellin told both men (R. 002041 and R. 001865) that the property was the area west of the road. 
Both men testified that a barb wire fence ran along the road just west of the road. After the purchase 
of the property, and when Cummings began to live on the ranch, Cummings began talking with two 
attorneys, Jackson Hoard and Rex Lewis, who he went into partnership with to create a subdivision 
on the property ( R. 001507). These parties engaged a surveyor, Parley Neeley, to subdivide the 
ranch in 1965. Cummings gained a clear title by purchasing back Al Pelton's portion of the 
property, and Pelton Quit Claimed the ranch to Cummings using the same description as originally 
given to by Emil Marcellin which was the only description of the whole property. This transaction 
occurred prior to the subdivision of the property. (R. 001506) Cummings remembered going to the 
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property with Neeley and showing him where the property division was located, the same as Emil 
Marcellin had done when the property was purchased. Cummings also testified he remembers giving 
to Neeley either a copy of a deed or a tax notice which contained the description. (R. 001507). 
Cummings also testified that his partners had read the deed or tax notices, and that he relied upon 
their opinion together with the understand ing from Emil Marcellin of where the property boundaries 
were located. Neeley testified that he could not see a deed or deed description in the file so that is 
probably why he called it a Post Survey (deposition of Neeley page 90): 
Q. Were you ever furnished a copy of a deed 
and asked to survey the description on the 
deed in connection with the work, 
Mr. Neeley? 
A. I have looked through the folder here, and 
I see no evidence of descriptions or deeds. I 
think that's indicative of why we call this a 
"Post Survey". 
Q. What do you mean by "Post Survey?" 
A. That's language used on the exhibit, "Post 
Survey." We use it in our office as the area 
that's being posted by the owner of the 
owners, outlined by the physical monuments, 
natural or artificial. In this case it would be 
artificial. There are wooden fences and roads. 
The statement above it not conclusive of whether or not Neeley was given a deed, only that one was 
not contained in the folder now, and that the survey was entitled a "Post Survey". 
The evidence as set forth above as testified at trial shows that Cummings acted in a 
reasonable manner in connection with the subdivision of the property, and relied upon his partners, 
Jackson Hoard and Rex Lewis, and the reliance and understanding that the property he was 
purchasing from Emil Marcellin, as shown to him by Emil Marcellin, was located west of the road, 
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as it existed then and now. Cummings1 testimony, which was undisputed, was that he gave a 
description, whether it be a tax notice or a deed, to Neeley prior to the beginning of his work to 
subdivide the property. These acts show no malice or implied malice of any kind in the Cummings' 
transaction. Cummings acted under the belief to the best of his knowledge and understanding in 
having the property subdivided, and selling portions of the property to other individuals. There are 
no other facts in the record to show any acts of malice on the part of Cummings. 
B. THE EVIDENCE MARSHALLED SHOWED THAT 
THE GILLMORS ARE NOT ENTITLED TO DAMAGES 
(ATTORNEYS FEES) FOR SLANDER OF TITLE 
First Security Bank of Utah v. Banberrv Crossing. 780 P.2d 1253 (Utah 1989) sets forth the 
elements of Slander of Title and what must be present for a court to award damages. The elements 
are: 
Next to be determined is whether Appellees slandered Banberry's 
title, a claimant must prove that (1) there was a publication of 
a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, (2) the 
statement was false, (3) the statement was made with malice, and 
(4) the statement caused actual or special damages. Citing 
Bass v. Planned Management Services. Inc., 761 P. 2d 566, 568 
(Utah 1988), and cases cited therein. 
The first two elements only exist if the finding of the court is correct in Quieting Title to the 
Gillmors. The third element of malice as shown above does not exist either as implied nor is actual 
malice. Cummings acted as a reasonable person under the circumstances as set forth. The fourth 
element exists as to damages only in the range of special damages or attorney's fees in pursuing the 
litigation. Therefore no damages should have been awarded under the current situation and the 
court erred in awarding damages. 
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C. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ALLOWING 
AN OFF-SET OF THE SETTLEMENT PAYMENT 
RESULTING IN THE GILLMORS RECEIVING 
AN UNJUST ENRICHMENT 
The court erred in not allowing part of the settlement the Gillmors received from the other 
defending parties toward the judgement of attorney's fees awarded to the Gillmors. If the difference 
is not applied between the value of the same parcel of disputed land and the amount received in 
settlement, then the Gillmors reap a 76% increase in value of the property, in light of the assertion 
in the Appellees' brief that the amount received was to purchase the property from the Gillmors (R. 
002025). If this theory is true, then a piece of property that had a fair market valued, for example, 
of $7000.00, was tied up in litigation, and in the course of the litigation a settlement was made in 
the amount of $40,000, and then the party receiving the settlement asserted that the amount 
received for settlement was actually to purchase the property only, then it is obvious that a $33,000 
increase in market value would be derived by merely having the property in litigation. This 
scenario is what is taking place if an off set of the difference between the fair market value and the 
so called purchase of the property by way of the settlement, the Gillmors will have received an 
enhanced value or become unjustly enriched only because of the litigation. This inequity should 
not be allowed to stand. 
POINT III 
THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES FAILED TO RESPOND 
TO DEFENDANT/APPELLANT'S MARSHALLING OF 
EVIDENCE ARGUMENT AND THEREFORE 
THE COURT DECISION MUST BE 
REVERSED ON THE ISSUE OF 
BOUNDARY BY ACQUIESCENCE 
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The Plaintiffs/Appellees have failed to respond to the Defendant/Appellant's marshalling of 
the evidence argument. The testimony at trial and all evidence marshalled in the Appellant's brief 
showed clearly that: 
1. Cummings occupied the land openly unto a point clearly marked by a monument, 
(the road), which was fenced on the west side of said road from 1961. Not disputed after 1964 when 
Frank Marcellin even testified that a fence was always on the west side of the road. 
2. That the adjoining owners mutually acquiesced in the division line as was 
demonstrated by Steve Gillmor who ran the family sheep business who asked permission to enter 
the property to water the sheep ((R.001526); and no one ever questioned the road as the division 
of the property until the filing of the current action in December of 1987. This was undisputed. 
3. For a long period of time is the third element, and at trial it is undisputed that 
for 23 years at least Cummings occupied up to the road which was always bordered by a fence. 
4. The boundary was respected by all of the adjoining landowners until the initiation 
of the current suit, this element is also undisputed. 
Gillmors' brief states that the period of time was not long enough, that a fence was taken 
down, a new fence material put in its place. The only witness who questioned whether a fence was 
along the road in the disputed area for the whole period of time was Frank Marcellin who testified 
(R.001979) that he knew a fence was along the Old Ranch Road in the disputed area since 1964. 
This would make it at least twenty-three years between when Frank Marcellin said he was sure a 
fence was along the road until the filing of the suit in 1987. Clearly this meets the standards as have 
been set forth for a long period of time. 
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All of the evidence marshalled shows or demonstrates the lack of evidence to support a 
finding that Boundary by Acquiesce did not exist. Clearly all of the witnesses testified that 
Cummings occupied up to the road, and that a fence has always been in place along the west side 
of the road. Cummings testified that no one ever disputed his right to occupy the land until 1987, 
and in fact a member of the family often asked permission to cross the disputed area to water the 
sheep. This testimony was undisputed . The criteria to establish Boundary by Acquiescence is set 
forth in Van Dvke v. ChapelL 818 P.2d 1023 (S.Ct. Utah 1991). Cummings' occupation of the 
property meets all of the criteria set forth in Van Dyke. Cummings proved and tried as is shown 
by the evidence that has been marshalled that the Boundary by Acquiescence did exist. 
Courts have long held that the purpose of Boundary by Acquiescence is to allow the bones 
of the past to rest and be undistribed in the interest of justice. A case supporting this concept is 
Hobson v. Panquitch Lake Corp. 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 1978). The court should therefore reverse and 
direct the lower court to enter a judgment in favor of Cummings on the issue of Boundary by 
Acquiescence. 
POINT IV 
THE DEFENDANT/APPELLANT DID MARSHALL THE 
EVIDENCE WHICH SHOWS THAT THE 
PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES DID SLANDER 
TITLE TO PROPERTY OWNED BY 
CUMMINGS 
Cummings marshalled the evidence and showed that: 
1. There was a publication of a slanderous statement disparaging claimant's title, in 
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as much as Gillmors cause a survey and lis pendens to be filed on a piece of property which clearly 
they did not own title. 
2. The statement was false, inasmuch as the claim arose because of a error in the 
original partition decree which left out the tie to a monument the road causing an assumption to be 
made where the Gillmors claimed title to property they clearly never owned.. 
3. The statement was made with malice. These statements were made with the intent 
of depriving Cummings of his property by not having the original deeds reviewed with the partition 
decree when it was prepared. 
4. The statement caused actual or special damages, Cummings lost a sale of the 
property because Gillmors refused to review the lis pendens or survey until after the sale was 
frustrated and lost. After that point the Gillmors amended the partition description, modified the 
survey and amended the lis pendens. 
All of the evidence was marshalled to prove the points above, and, therefore, the court erred 
in dismissing Cummings' claim to Slander of Title. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
TO THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLEES 
Malice is an essential element of Slander of Title for which Attorneys Fees were awarded as 
a special damage. While Gillmors contend that the court erred in not allowing all of the attorneys 
fees, Cummings strongly contends that no malice, neither actual or implied, was present in any 
form of the transactions by Cummings. (See Point IIA above). Cummings acted as a reasonable 
individual in his transactions. If no malice was proven no attorneys fees should be awarded. 
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If the court finds that the evidence did support a finding of malice, then other elements of the 
cases should be reviewed: 
1. Gillmors had three sets of attorneys on the cases at various times. 
2. An appeal from a Summary Judgement which was awarded to the other defendant 
in which Cummings did not take an active role in. 
3. An off-set to the amount already received by the Gillmors in excess of the fair 
market value of the property in dispute should be applied towards attorney's fees award. 
All of these factors should come into play as what to, if anything, the Gillmors should be 
awarded as damages in the Slander of Title action. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court of Appeals should therefore review the evidence as marshalled and reverse the 
decision of the Third District Court, Quiet Title to the disputed strip of land to Cummings, award 
Cummings attorneys fees for Slander of Title for his property and direct the lower court to enter 
such judgment. It is clear, by the evidence marshalled, that the original deed gave the title of the 
land to Cummings and if not, Boundary by Acquiesce exists and therefore title should be quieted in 
Cummings; furthermore, Gillmors did Slander Title to Cummings' property and therefore an award 
of attorney's fees would be appropriate. 
DATED this 1^ day of February, 1995. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
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